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About this paper
Yunpeng Wang, Walid Saad, Zhu Han, H. Vincent Poor, Tamer Başar
A market model for distributed batteries and plug-in hybrid vehicles combines a truthful double auction with a noncooperative game in which storage owners strategically choose how much surplus energy to offer. The analysis establishes pure-strategy Nash equilibrium under discontinuous auction payoffs and introduces damped best-response dynamics; simulations report utility gains of up to 234.4% over a greedy baseline and faster convergence for sequential than parallel updates.
Key insights
- Quantity offers remain strategic even when reservation prices and buyer bids are truthfully reported; offering more energy can increase sales but lower the clearing price and increase discharge costs.
- Under the stated compactness, continuity, and concavity-related conditions, the discontinuous game still admits at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
- Market participation is endogenous: some storage owners optimally withhold energy when expected revenue fails to cover their reservation price and operating cost.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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