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About this paper
Aziz Mohaisen, Omar Al-Ibrahim, Charles Kamhoua, Kevin Kwiat, Laurent Njilla
An analysis of cyber threat intelligence sharing identifies critical gaps in addressing data privacy, indicator quality, and participant incentives within current systems and standards. This work proposes a conceptual framework for assessing privacy leakage and outlines a comprehensive research agenda to foster more secure and actionable intelligence exchange.
Key insights
- Information sharing paradigms are often designed without robust use models or comprehensive threat models, including insider threats.
- Existing cyber threat intelligence standards implicitly expose Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and sensitive operational data, demonstrating tangible privacy leakage risks.
- The quality and timeliness of shared indicators are critical for generating actionable intelligence but are frequently unaddressed by current mechanisms.
- Strategic behaviors like "free-riding" by participants undermine the effectiveness and sustainability of collaborative defense efforts.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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