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About this paper
Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz
The Shapley mediator allocates display chances among content providers according to their contribution to the best available user satisfaction, while allowing no item to be shown. The authors prove it satisfies four fairness properties and induces an exact potential game, so better-response moves converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. No mediator can guarantee both while always displaying an item.
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