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About this paper
Weian Li, Qi Qi, Changjun Wang, Changyuan Yu
The authors propose a joint ranking mechanism that places sponsored and organic products together, balancing ad revenue against expected merchandise sales. Its ranking combines adjusted advertiser values and estimated sales, with a parameter controlling the trade-off. In simulations, it earns more revenue than a fixed-slot Myerson auction baseline at matched GMV, except under perfect negative correlation between ad quality and bidder value.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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