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About this paper
Santiago Balseiro, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar
The authors model budgeted advertisers bidding for context-dependent placements using value pacing: type-specific multipliers scale values before buyers bid strategically against similarly paced competitors. The model establishes equal expected payments across standard auction formats under risk neutrality, symmetry, independent buyer weight vectors, and budgets enforced in expectation. With zero reserves, pacing-equilibrium liquid welfare is at least half optimal liquid welfare.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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