Reproduce “Bidding Agent Design in the LinkedIn Ad Marketplace” on OpenResearch
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About this paper
Yuan Gao, Kaiyu Yang, Yuanlong Chen, Min Liu, Noureddine El Karoui
A generalized optimization framework for automated bidding agents was developed and deployed in the LinkedIn ad marketplace. It achieved a statistically significant 8.25% increase in advertiser Return on Investment while maintaining neutral platform revenue.
Key insights
- Optimal bidding strategies can be derived universally as b*_t(λ) = (h_t/g_t)^-1 (v_t/λ), simplifying to v_t/λ for second-price auctions and involving a shading factor for first-price auctions.
- Diverse advertiser constraints can be systematically incorporated into a single bidding formula through additional Lagrangian multipliers, allowing for comprehensive and holistic optimization.
- The framework inherently guarantees optimal budget allocation across multiple placements and ad units, ensuring equal marginal return on investment across all components.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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