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About this paper

Tony T. Wang, Adam Gleave, Tom Tseng, Kellin Pelrine, Nora Belrose, Joseph Miller, Michael D. Dennis, Yawen Duan and 3 more

Researchers from UC Berkeley, FAR AI, MIT, and McGill revealed that state-of-the-art superhuman Go AIs, like KataGo, are vulnerable to adversarial policies that exploit strategic blind spots, such as misjudging "cyclic groups" of stones. These adversaries achieved up to a 95.7% win rate against KataGo with 4096 MCTS visits and 72% against KataGo with 10 million MCTS visits, despite playing poorly against human amateurs.

Key insights

  • Superhuman capabilities and extensive self-play training do not guarantee worst-case robustness, as state-of-the-art Go AIs are highly vulnerable to specific strategic exploits that lead to catastrophic failures.
  • Increasing MCTS search depth is insufficient as a standalone defense, as even at computationally prohibitive search budgets (10 million visits), KataGo remained highly vulnerable to exploitation.
  • The discovered exploits represent comprehensible strategic vulnerabilities, not subtle numerical perturbations, as a human Go expert was able to learn and manually execute the attack to beat superhuman AIs.

Summary by alphaXiv.

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