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About this paper
Yang Cai, Zhe Feng, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Grigoris Velegkas
This paper presents a framework for ad auctions that maximizes long-term discounted revenue by explicitly modeling the dynamic impact of ad quality on user engagement. It introduces a modified virtual welfare mechanism that integrates immediate advertiser payments with future changes in user click-through rates, offering both theoretically optimal solutions and practically implementable approximations.
Key insights
- The long-term revenue-optimal ad auction is characterized as a Myerson's auction that maximizes a modified virtual welfare, where the modification quantifies the expected future revenue impact of showing specific ads.
- The problem of optimizing for long-term revenue with dynamic user response is computationally tractable, with algorithms capable of learning approximately optimal policies from a polynomial number of samples.
- Simple, widely used mechanisms, specifically two-stage second-price auctions with personalized reserves, can achieve constant-factor approximations to the optimal long-term revenue, while precisely matching user state transitions.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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