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About this paper
Eric Budish, Ruiquan Gao, Abraham Othman, Aviad Rubinstein, Qianfan Zhang
The authors present an algorithm for allocating schedules under seat limits using A-CEEI, which gives students nearly equal artificial budgets. It adjusts course prices and uses budget perturbations to reduce excess demand. On the Law Fall 19 instance, Fast reached zero clearing error in under a minute, while Benchmark had not converged after four hours; this result is instance-specific.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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