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About this paper
Maria Alejandra Ramirez, Yoav Kolumbus, Rosemarie Nagel, David Wolpert, Jürgen Jost
The authors study whether regret-minimizing learning follows equilibrium predictions when an outside party makes a binding offer to leave a game unchanged for a fee or alter incentives. In a specified asymmetric 2×2 game, backward induction predicts acceptance, but both simulated learning methods converge to declining. A counteroffer changes that outcome in the illustrated case, not universally.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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