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About this paper

Jessica Dai

Jessica Dai from the University of California, Berkeley, critically examines the anthropomorphic tendency in AI ethics, arguing that AI systems lack human-like moral agency and proposing alternative frameworks. The research distinguishes between mechanistic and volitional agency, suggesting AI should be analyzed as the outcome of political processes or within application-specific ethical guidelines rather than as an independent moral agent.

Key insights

  • The anthropomorphic view of AI (mechanistic agency) is insufficient for ethical analysis, as AI systems do not meet the criteria for moral responsibility, especially "relevant control."
  • AI systems fundamentally lack "volitional agency," as they possess no intrinsic desires or original purpose, rendering the concept of AI as a conscious moral agent incoherent.
  • Shifting the focus from AI's "agency" to application-specific ethical criteria and viewing AI as an outcome of political processes offers a more robust framework for ethics and accountability.

Summary by alphaXiv.

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