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About this paper
Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, Kei Uzui
The authors study a coordination game in which a policymaker uses public information to insure against retreat from its preferred action. The policy stays silent while aggregate play tracks a target and sends inconclusive signals after shortfalls. As η approaches zero, the worst-equilibrium value converges to the favorable-selection benchmark and the sequential-optimality gap vanishes; silence requires the preferred action not be strictly dominated.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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