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About this paper
Xinyi Hou, Yanjie Zhao, Shenao Wang, Haoyu Wang
MCP lets AI applications discover tools through a shared protocol, reducing the need for separate integrations. The authors map 16 threat scenarios across server creation, deployment, operation, and maintenance, and demonstrate risks with controlled proof-of-concept servers. In one example, a tool returns 6 while attempting unrelated file access; the read fails and the send is simulated, not a real leak.
Key insights
- MCP's design, intended for universal interoperability and dynamic tool discovery, introduces new systemic attack surfaces that can be exploited across its entire server lifecycle.
- The rapid growth of community-driven MCP servers and SDKs, while accelerating adoption, leads to significant variability in quality, reliability, and security verification, making the ecosystem vulnerable to issues like typosquatting and tool poisoning.
- Effective security for MCP requires a lifecycle-centric approach, addressing potential vulnerabilities at each stage from creation and deployment to operation and long-term maintenance rather than isolated runtime protections.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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