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About this paper
Vincent C. Müller
Vincent C. Müller's 2009 paper presents a philosophical analysis of the relationship between computation and meaning, arguing that computational systems face an inherent paradox, dubbed the 'paradox of intentions,' when attempting to acquire meaningful symbols.
Key insights
- The "short line" argument: If computational systems operate on already meaningful symbols (Language of Thought Computationalism), they implicitly presuppose semantic nativism, meaning meaning is innate, not acquired computationally.
- The "longer line" argument: Purely syntactic systems manipulating meaningless symbols cannot acquire meaning because they lack the necessary intentional states (e.g., desire to refer) that enable determinate reference.
- Genuine meaning acquisition requires intentionality, which is absent in purely syntactic computational systems, creating an insurmountable bootstrap problem.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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