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About this paper
Adeela Bashir, Zia Ush Shamszaman, Zhao Song, Anh Han
Researchers from Teesside University developed an Evolutionary Game Theory model to analyze the co-evolutionary dynamics of cyber attackers and defenders, identifying stable strategies and the influence of defence parameters. The model reveals that a continuous attack-defence scenario is most common, but even modest attacker penalties can drastically shift the system towards successful defence and minimal attacks, increasing overall social welfare.
Key insights
- A continuous 'Defence, Attack' (E4) equilibrium emerged as the most frequent stable outcome (39.8% of sampled configurations) in the absence of external enforcement, highlighting the prevalent 'cyber arms race'.
- Increasing the probability of successful defence (`v`) significantly shifts the system towards a desirable 'Defence, No Attack' (E3) state, peaking around `v=0.9` for optimal deterrence.
- The introduction of even small probabilities of catching and penalizing attackers drastically alters the equilibrium distribution, making 'Defence, No Attack' the dominant stable state, reinforcing the importance of deterrence mechanisms.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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