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About this paper

Filip Rezabek, Jonathan Passerat-Palmbach, Moe Mahhouk, Frieder Erdmann, Andrew Miller

The paper identifies a critical misalignment between Trusted Execution Environments' (TEEs) threat models, which exclude physical attacks, and their deployment realities in cloud environments where physical security is implicitly trusted but not verifiable. It advocates for standardizing hardware identifiers (PPID) in attestation and extending TEE threat models to include physical risks, particularly for high-value Web3 applications.

Key insights

  • A fundamental trust gap exists in TEE deployments due to the unverified reliance on cloud providers for physical security, which current attestation mechanisms cannot address.
  • The Protected Platform Identifier (PPID) is an existing, secure hardware identifier that could bridge this gap if standardized for disclosure by cloud providers.
  • Achieving true end-to-end security for confidential computing requires explicitly extending TEE threat models beyond software-only attacks to include physical and supply-chain vectors.

Summary by alphaXiv.

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