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About this paper

Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris

Researchers from Yale, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, and MIT developed a simple constant share procurement mechanism that guarantees a fixed fraction of efficient social surplus when the buyer lacks prior knowledge of supplier costs. This mechanism achieves the highest possible worst-case performance, known as the competitive ratio, across a broad range of cost functions, providing robust performance without relying on complex Bayesian priors.

Key insights

  • Remarkably simple constant share mechanisms can achieve the maximum possible worst-case performance guarantee (the competitive ratio) in complex screening problems without requiring prior information.
  • The convexity of supplier cost functions (and concavity of buyer utility) is crucial for achieving non-trivial and constant competitive ratios, distinguishing these findings from prior work where guarantees could be arbitrarily weak.
  • The competitive ratio offers a 'scale-independent' robustness criterion, providing sharp predictions for procurement policy across varying scales and types of procurement events.

Summary by alphaXiv.

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