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About this paper

Matthieu Bettinger, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, Pascal Felber, Etienne Rivière, Valerio Schiavoni, Anthony Simonet-Boulogne

TriHaRd introduces a distributed trusted time protocol for CPU-level Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) that provides highly resilient and accurate timekeeping against malicious host attacks. It prevents the propagation of manipulated time, maintaining clock drift within 1ms and 0.3ppm while significantly reducing the magnitude of undetectable clock manipulations compared to prior methods.

Key insights

  • Decoupling peer consistency checks from actual clock adjustments is crucial to prevent malicious nodes from forcing honest nodes to adopt manipulated time, a fundamental flaw in prior distributed TEE time solutions.
  • Implementing mechanisms like 'self-tainting' to force periodic re-validation of a TEE's clock state prevents attackers from isolating nodes to accumulate significant, undetected clock drift.
  • Attacks that attempt to manipulate TEE time can either achieve minimal, tightly controlled drift or lead to a significant, detectable reduction in the attacked node's availability and latency, challenging an attacker's goal of covert manipulation.

Summary by alphaXiv.

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