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About this paper
Paulius Rauba, Simonas Cepenas, Mihaela van der Schaar
The authors frame delegated LLM systems as principal–agent problems, where agents may hold information supervisors cannot cheaply observe. When goals conflict, this gap can create agency loss through hidden actions or concealed agent types. They connect these patterns to moral hazard and adverse selection, respectively, and propose studying incentives and monitoring. This is a conceptual framework, not tested mitigation.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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