Reproduce “Cost of Manipulation in AMM-Based Oracles” on OpenResearch
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About this paper
Sebastian Müller, Nordine Moumeni, Adel Messaoudi
A model quantifies the economic cost an attacker must incur to manipulate AMM-based on-chain price oracles, deriving closed-form expressions for Constant Product Market Makers and identifying optimal aggregation strategies for oracle designers to maximize this cost. The framework establishes quantitative benchmarks for oracle robustness, contrasting the security properties of weighted mean and median aggregation methods.
Key insights
- The economic cost to manipulate a single CPMM's price by a factor $r$ is given by $y_0(\sqrt{r} + 1/\sqrt{r} - 2)$, directly scaling with initial liquidity depth.
- For small price distortions, liquidity-weighted means offer higher manipulation costs than medians, but for large distortions, liquidity-weighted medians prove more robust due to their global optimality.
- Perfect cross-pool arbitrage fundamentally changes the dynamics, causing manipulation cost to depend solely on the total aggregated liquidity across all pools, behaving like a single, large CPMM.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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