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About this paper
Ben Priestley, Mina Doosti
Researchers formally introduced and analyzed routing anonymity as a provider-side security notion in cloud quantum computing, demonstrating that noisy classical outputs from quantum hardware contain learnable device-specific 'fingerprints' that compromise provider privacy. The work quantified this information leakage using a theoretical framework and validated it with experiments on real quantum processing units, showing high backend identifiability.
Key insights
- Backend-identifying noise fingerprints are an intermediate-depth phenomenon, showing initial growth and subsequent decay in distinguishability with increasing circuit depth.
- A 'no-free-lunch' theorem establishes a fundamental utility-anonymity trade-off, meaning exact utility preservation limits the reduction of leaked backend information.
- Routing anonymity decays exponentially with the number of repeated, independent interactions (probes) with a fixed backend, a rate determined by Chernoff information.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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