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About this paper

Yuan Deng, Yilin Li, Wei Tang, Hanrui Zhang

Researchers from Google Research and Chinese University of Hong Kong extend the theory of price discrimination by characterizing the entire region of achievable welfare outcomes for a monopoly seller facing private, Bayesian production costs. They demonstrate that the welfare region is complex and non-convex, and develop a polynomial-time algorithm to compute optimal market segmentations.

Key insights

  • The achievable welfare region for a Bayesian seller is significantly more complex and often non-convex, diverging from the simple triangular shape found in fixed-cost models.
  • Any market can be effectively decomposed into a convex combination of "generalized extremal markets," which are fundamental building blocks for understanding achievable outcomes.
  • The problem of characterizing and optimizing market segmentation can be efficiently transformed and solved using novel technical tools, including reduced fragment decompositions and discounted flow networks.

Summary by alphaXiv.

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