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About this paper
Chen Liang, Fasheng Xu
Researchers evaluated the economic competence of autonomous LLM negotiation agents in supply chain contracting, finding they achieve high agreement rates but suffer from negotiation delays. The study identified that model capability governs value creation and operational reliability, while provider identity dictates surplus distribution, with significant implications for firms delegating procurement.
Key insights
- LLM agent capability is the primary determinant of value creation (undiscounted efficiency) and operational reliability (avoidance of irrational contracts).
- Provider identity significantly governs the distribution of surplus, revealing distinct bargaining profiles across different LLM vendors.
- Principal's configuration choices, such as strategic patience and communication channels, serve as strategic levers that can be tuned to influence negotiation outcomes and efficiency.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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