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About this paper
Grzegorz Jamróz
A game-theoretic framework for markets with competing strategic mediators is introduced, applying it to autonomous routing and driving (ARAD) service providers. The research demonstrates that even a slight perceived quality advantage for one mediator can lead to a complete market monopoly through optimized randomized routing strategies.
Key insights
- A strictly dominant mediator, even with a slight perceived quality advantage, can secure a 100% market share in equilibrium in share-maximizing routing games, leading to monopoly.
- Mediators require sophisticated, often randomized, collective routing strategies (e.g., 50-50 splits) to effectively manage congestion and user perceived costs, as simple deterministic routing is suboptimal for market share maximization.
- The framework reveals that market dynamics in competitive algorithmic service markets are highly sensitive to subtle differences in perceived service quality or user preferences.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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