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About this paper
Mark Chen, Xi Chen, Hao Cui, William Pires, Jonah Stockwell
The authors prove that computing an approximate mixed Bayes–Nash equilibrium for first-price auctions with correlated private values is PPAD-complete, even with bids limited to {0, 1/5, 2/5}. They reduce from a hypergraph auction game, then use shifted bids and dummy bidders to handle nonparticipants. This is a worst-case result; independent-private-values auctions remain unresolved.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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