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About this paper
Chenyu Zhang, Rohit Parasnis, Saurabh Amin
Poll learns a welfare-maximizing price vector for a multi-activity network game with private technologies. It estimates preference-adjusted centralities through local random-walk polls, using endpoint preference–price reports. In a funding scenario modeled on the DBLP coauthorship network, Poll reached a welfare gap of at most 10⁻⁵ with 1,572 times fewer pairwise exchanges than Consensus; this is not a measured speedup.
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