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About this paper
Ciamac C. Moallemi, Mallesh M. Pai, Dan Robinson, Christoph Schlegel
The paper models competition between two proposers for a transaction opportunity and its effect on their locations. In a no-reserve, first-price auction, each proposer’s profit increases with the standard deviation of its exclusive information. With two sources of positive weight at the ends of a line and distance-based delays, the unique equilibrium places one proposer at each source, a model-specific result rather than a deployment guarantee.
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