Reproduce “The Delegation Dilemma: Economies of Scale, Accountability, and Polycentric Governance” on OpenResearch
Turn your favorite coding agents into research agents that review literature, develop hypotheses, and run experiments.
Universal app for Apple silicon and Intel. Requires macOS 11 or later.
About this paper
Arin Mukhopadhyay, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Panayiotis Danassis
The authors analyze an abstract game in which 30 language-model agents can share a fixed fee by delegating authority to centers that may take transfers from members. Their theory links larger groups to weaker exit-based accountability. In simulations, centralized-start centers captured 104.4% of delegation surplus, while decentralized-start delegates retained 8.1%; these results do not show delegation always harms members.
Summary by alphaXiv.
Tip: change arxiv.org to autoarxiv.org in any arXiv abstract link to open the paper here.