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About this paper
Matteo Bollini, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi
The authors develop an exactly optimal polynomial-time mechanism for assigning one task when contractors privately know their success probabilities and effort costs. It reduces effort incentives to a critical success payment, then allocates using ironed virtual utilities that account for both characteristics. Under independent finite types, truthful profit is at least 1/(NK) of the full-information benchmark; this guarantee is model-specific.
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