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About this paper

Elias Fernández Domingos, Genki Ichinose, Wakaba Tateishi, Tom Lenaerts

The authors model how costly information about a group threshold affects collective-risk outcomes, allowing individuals to learn the threshold and act accordingly. In evolutionary-game simulations, information costing 0.01 raises group success across nearly the full risk range for four threshold priors, while a cost of 0.10 reverses the pattern. Sharing can lower the cooperative tipping point; results assume stylized strategies and fixed attackers.

Summary by alphaXiv.

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