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About this paper
Chengkai Zhang, Yuhao Li, Elaine Shi, Mengqian Zhang, Lirong Xia, Qishen Han
The authors present an order-insensitive ascending-price auction for automated market makers, with supply adapting to the pool’s pricing curve. Under an escrow-backed cap on aggregate budgets in each trader’s true direction, it is individually rational, exactly settles, resists Sybil strategies, and achieves weak Pareto optimality for eligible bids. The result assumes bids cannot be censored.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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