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About this paper
Chengkai Zhang, Lirong Xia, Elaine Shi, Mengqian Zhang, Qishen Han, Yuhao Li
The authors prove that no deterministic, anonymous, two-asset batch AMM in the stated model can satisfy incentive compatibility and weak local efficiency alongside individual rationality and exact settlement. The impossibility holds even with censorship resilience and unlimited block space. Separate mechanisms meet both guarantees when each of three strategic capabilities is restricted, showing the theorem’s boundary.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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