Reproduce “Fooling Relying Parties of the EUDI Wallet Architecture: Credential Pooling Attacks and CRESTA, a Standard-Compliant Countermeasure” on OpenResearch
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About this paper
Leonardo Rufini, Ivan Visconti
The authors demonstrate that two people can pool genuine EUDI Wallet credentials from separate phones and have them accepted together. CRESTA binds credential keys through secure-hardware evidence at issuance and lets relying parties check the binding while preserving fresh per-credential keys. Its testbed rejected pooled presentations, but emulated secure hardware and depends on stated trust assumptions.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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