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About this paper
Junyan Liu, Haipeng Luo, Lillian J. Ratliff, Zihan Zhang
The authors develop a method for uninformed Markov games where learners see losses and next states but not opponents’ actions. It combines global weights over future-loss predictions with state-specific policy mixtures to align feedback with executed losses. It guarantees empirical Nash-value regret \widetilde O(H^{3/2}S\sqrt{AK}) against arbitrary adaptive opponents with probability at least 1−δ. Its candidate class is exponentially large.
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