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About this paper
Yuhang Chen, Yuda Feng, Weijiang Hu, Shi Li, Ruilong Zhang
The authors study fair allocation of indivisible items among agents with monotone, subadditive valuations. Their algorithms use a configuration LP and randomized matching to reserve standout items, then round overlapping bundles without reusing items; they assume demand-query access. They give polynomial-time O(√n) max-min and O(Γ(w)) weighted Nash social welfare approximations, independent of item count; the latter guarantees expected welfare.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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