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About this paper
Yaohao Liu, Mengfan Ma, Mingyu Xiao
The authors formulate two-sided menu design as matched trading distributions across quality thresholds. They replace production costs with their greatest convex minorant, preserving optimal profit and welfare and restricting an optimal menu to contact qualities. Under monotone hazard conditions on both sides, profit-maximizing welfare is at least 1/(e-1) of optimal welfare, a tight bound; regularity alone gives no positive uniform guarantee.
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