Reproduce “On Competing Sellers with Substitutable Goods” on OpenResearch
Turn your favorite coding agents into research agents that review literature, develop hypotheses, and run experiments.
Universal app for Apple silicon and Intel. Requires macOS 11 or later.
About this paper
Moshe Babaioff, Yuval Grofman, Brendan Lucier, Raghuvansh R. Saxena
The authors characterize Alice’s optimal selling menu in a two-seller model with substitute goods, fixed public values, and a risk-neutral unit-demand buyer. Alice commits before Bob responds, and the buyer chooses whom to visit first. Lottery options shape Bob’s incentives; when a<Cb, optimal revenue exceeds posted-price revenue, reaching about 0.352b at a=b; otherwise, posted pricing is optimal.
Summary by alphaXiv.
Tip: change arxiv.org to autoarxiv.org in any arXiv abstract link to open the paper here.