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About this paper
Julien Fixary, Rémi Castera, Rida Laraki
The authors develop a theory of weighted networks with coalition interactions, capacity limits, and participants’ finite budgets. They define coalitionwise stability for feasible changes to one coalition at a time and prove existence under continuity and componentwise quasiconcavity. They also define a perturbation-based refinement; its equivalence to revised trembling-hand stability requires strict monotonicity, while existence requires fixed-sign monotonicity.
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