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About this paper
Paul Dütting, Yingkai Li, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Jinzhao Wu
The authors study how a project owner should combine public information disclosure and success-contingent contracts when a team’s costly effort is hidden. For statewise submodular success probabilities, full transparency achieves at least three-quarters of the best joint signaling and contract payoff, a tight guarantee. With complementary production, full disclosure can yield zero while no disclosure yields positive payoff.
Summary by alphaXiv.
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