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About this paper

Boris Velasevic, Nicolas Lanzetti, Eric Mazumdar

The authors develop a tunable framework for games in which each player plans against an adversary that can alter other players’ policies but pays for deviations. A deviation penalty interpolates between Nash control and H-infinity control. In simulations, robustness lowers the 95th-percentile cost from 43.74 to 33.03, while lower percentiles rise slightly; social cost dips over part of the range.

Summary by alphaXiv.

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